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Morality and Pretextuality, 
Psychiatry and Law: Of 
"Ordinary Common Sense," 
~eurist ic Reasoning, and 
Cognitive Dissonance 
Michael L. Perlin 
The thesis of this paper is that we will not make significant progress in under- 
standing the tensions between the legal and mental health systems until we look 
carefully at a series of dissonances that affect both systems. We must consider the 
way that the law frequently condones pretextuality as a way of dealing with troubling 
or cognitively dissonant information, and the way that mental health professionals 
encourage a self-referential concept of morality as a way of subverting legal 
doctrines with which they disagree. These dissonances must be considered contex- 
tually in connection with the ways that courts generally read social science data 
and the ways that jurors and legislators employ such cognitive devices as "ordinary 
common sense" and heuristic reasoning in their judgments of cases involving mental 
disability questions. To ameliorate the current dilemma, we must redefine institu- 
tional and professional roles, reconsider the way we privilege expertise, recalibrate 
our allocation of "moral jurisdiction" over these matters, and consciously confront 
the way our simplifying thinking mechanisms distort the underlying social and 
political issues. 
The law prides itself on its fairness and 
its inherent sense of rationality.' The 
This paper is adapted from a luncheon presentation at 
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chiatry and Law, San Diego, California, October 1990. 
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Toronto. ON, Canada, and at a University of San Diego 
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legal trial process presupposes an ascer- 
tainable "truth" as a basis for testi- 
mony,' and severe sanctions are im- 
posed for the commission of p e r j ~ r y . ~  
Psychiatry and psychology, in turn, re- 
ject notions of a unitary concept of "rea- 
son," pointing out that the range of hu- 
man behavior is infinite, and that un- 
conscious variables and processes, 
conflicts, anxieties and defenses-the ir- 
rational-are frequently the primary 
causes of b e h a ~ i o r . ~  The mental health 
professions also counsel practitioners 
not to impose their sense of "morality" 
Bull Am Acad Psychiatry Law, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1991 131 
Perlin 
on patients or clients5 nor to employ 
their authority as a defense in dealing 
with such  client^.^ 
At the point that these two systems 
intersect, something strange happens. 
Perhaps because of the "substantial gulf 
between scientific and legal discourse,"' 
perhaps because of the different training 
received by mental health professionals 
(MHPs) and  lawyer^,^ perhaps because 
of the public's radically differing percep- 
tions of the substance of law and the 
mental health  profession^,^ those who 
are involved in both professional arenas 
must consider the way that these internal 
and inherent differences create tensions 
that have a measurable effect on what 
happens when these cultures collide, es- 
pecially in the forensic mental disability 
system. 
I propose to look at this collision from 
several vantage points that, to the best 
of my knowledge, have not been seri- 
ously explored: from the perspectives of 
the way that law-the system extolling 
"truth" as a highest virtue-adopts pre- 
textuality as a means of dealing with 
information or situations that it finds 
troubling or dissonant, and the way that 
the mental health professions-the sys- 
tems that counsel against attributions of 
"morality" in interpersonal dealings- 
impose a self-referential concept of mo- 
rality in dealing with legal interactions. 
I will argue that, if we are to understand 
why the historic relationshiplo between 
the law and the mental health profes- 
sions is seen as a rocky one, character- 
ized variously as an uneasy detente, a 
shotgun marriage, or a marriage de 
convenunce," it is necessary to consider 
the question through these two filters of 
pretextuality and morality. 
Let me suggest several overlapping 
premises. First. much of what lawyers 
say about forensic testimony is pretex- 
tual.I2 Second, much of what forensic 
mental health professionals who fre- 
quently wear the hat of expert witness 
say about individual cases is similarly 
pretextual, ostensibly for reasons of 
"m~ra l i ty ." '~  Third, much of the way 
judges interpret forensic testimony is te- 
leological.14 Fourth, much of the way 
that jurors feel about all of this is high- 
lighted by overwhelming ambivalence.I5 
Fifth, much of what legislators try to do 
in this area appears to be overwhelm- 
ingly futile.16 Sixth, very few of the rest 
of the public cares very much about all 
of this almost all of the time, but do care 
intensely about all of it in the case of the 
rare "moral mistake," especially when it 
involves one of the rare but dreaded 
"false positives." l 7  
I further propose to show that ( 1 )  little 
of any of this can be coherently ex- 
plained without refuge to such cognitive 
psychology constructs as heuristic rea- 
soning, psychological reactance, and 
cognitive dissonance:" (2) the relation- 
ship between the mutually symbiotic 
systems of law and forensic mental 
health is an increasingly more fragile 
one, and, as the Hinckley acquittal dem- 
onstrated, one vivid, outrageous case 
can wipe out the results of years of study, 
collection of empirical data, and reflec- 
tive inquiry into any aspect of the men- 
tal health systemI9; and (3) most of what 
is written-in both law and the mental 
health professions-utterly ignores both 
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of my major premises as well as these 
two  proposition^.^^ My hope in writing 
this paper is that both lawyers and men- 
tal health professionals will come to rec- 
ognize that, even if the pursuit of 
agreement2' appears to be beyond us, we 
can at least acknowledge that there are 
bridges to be built. 
Pretextuality of Law 
To label the law as pretextual might 
sound a bit presumptous or nihilistic, 
but I do not mean to be either." What I 
am suggesting is this: there is a dramatic 
tension between those areas in which 
courts accept (either implicitly or explic- 
itly) dishonesty in certain subject-matter 
areas and those where they erect insur- 
mountable barriers to guard against 
what they perceive as feigning, malin- 
gering, or other misuse of the legal sys- 
Several varying examples should illus- 
trate the phenomenon. Regularly, in 
search and seizure suppression motion 
hearings,14 courts wink at police testi- 
mony that suggests that the defendant, 
after "gesturing furtively," dropped a 
glassine envelope containing a powdery 
substance in plain view of the officer, 
and then subsequently and sponta- 
neously blurted out, "That heroin is 
mine." This testimony is clearly pretex- 
t ~ a l , ~ ~  as are statements by legislators 
that their rationale for a "moment of 
silence" bill had nothing to do with 
school prayer, and was merely to insure 
that students had time for "private con- 
templation and intro~pect ion."~~ Again, 
courts accept this uncritically and at face 
value. 
Elsewhere, studies confirm that the 
mandated provision of free counsel to 
indigents facing imprisonment upon 
conviction is frequently subverted by 
both economic and political factors well 
known to, but ignored by, those respon- 
sible for such provision of counsel," 
again with little perceptible impact on 
actual practice.28 In yet another sort of 
example, even though the District of 
Columbia Code contains a provision 
that patients can invoke seeking either 
periodic review of their commitment or 
an independent psychiatric evaluation, 
evidence developed in a recent case re- 
vealed that, in the 22 years since passage 
of the relevant law, not a single patient 
had exercised his rights to this statutory 
review.29 Finally, a recent opinion by 
Justice Scalia on the "lawyers' question" 
of what weight is to be given to congres- 
sional debate in determining a statute's 
meaning-in which he characterized in- 
terpretative rules that assume a common 
understanding on the part of each con- 
gressperson as to the meaning of the 
enacted legislation as a "benign fic- 
ti~n"~~-suggests that the Supreme 
Court is, in some areas, willing to con- 
cede the pretextuality of some level of 
legal decisionmaking. 
An even more troubling example is 
the Supreme Court's decision in Mc- 
Cleskey v. Keir~p,~' rejecting the use of 
statistical evidence offered to show sys- 
temic racial discrimination in Georgia 
prosecutors' decisions to seek the death 
penalty, and in jurors' decisions to im- 
pose the death sentence based upon the 
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victim's race.32 Following McCleskey, in 
order to prevail, the defendant must 
show "that the decisionmakers in his 
case acted with discriminatory pur- 
pose,"33 a standard that, presumably, in- 
telligent Georgia prosecutors will be able 
to avoid. 
Contrast this acceptance of pretex- 
tuality, on the other hand, with the 
court's well-documented "fear of fak- 
ing" in response to any argument seek- 
ing expanded admissibility of testimony 
as to mental disability in a variety of 
criminal procedure settings,34 as evi- 
denced in Chief Justice Rehnquist's reg- 
ular invocation of "parade of horrors" 
arguments in such cases.35 Similarly con- 
sider courts' "ordinary common sensi- 
cal" (OCS) beliefs36 in popular myths 
that have arisen as to such issues as "the 
litigation e~plosion,"'~ the frequent use 
of exaggerated testimony in personal in- 
jury c a s e ~ , ~ ~  or the insubstantiality of 
most prisoner pro se writs.39 The fact 
that former Attorney General William 
French Smith could tell Congress that 
the insanity defense "allows so many 
persons to commit crimes of violence"40 
at the same time as one of his top aides 
candidly conceded that the number of 
such cases "is really probably statistically 
insignificantn4' speaks for itself.42 
This paradox reflects two deeper is- 
sues: the cognitive dissonance43 that is 
caused when legal decisions violate so- 
cial norms, and our refusal to acknowl- 
edge the extent of this dissonance. 
Courts apparently allow (perhaps en- 
courage) pretextuality so as to mediate 
the (perceived) draconian impact of im- 
posed-from-above constitutional deci- 
sions (or, in the case of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, decisions such as Miranda v. 
Arizona44 or Mapp v. Ohio45 that it is 
institutionally unwilling to overrule),46 
at the same time that they fantasize 
about feared pretextuality in cases where 
anecdotal myths prevail or where un- 
conscious values predominant. 
This tension should help to explain 
some of the discomfort courts feel with 
forensic testimony in mental health 
cases (both civil and criminal). Decisions 
such as 0 'Connor v. D o n a l d ~ o n ~ ~  (setting 
out a constitutional right to liberty), 
Jackson v. Indiana4* (applying the due 
process clause to incompetency to stand 
trial commitments) and the line of cases 
following Lessard v. Schmidt49 (applying 
procedural due process to all aspects of 
the involuntary civil commitment sys- 
tem) have never been popular with trial 
judges or with court administrators for 
a variety of instrumental, functional, 
normative, and philosophical reasons.50 
Notwithstanding the staggeringly unan- 
imous data base of empirical evidence 
to the ~ o n t r a r y , ~ '  trial judges continue 
to see the insanity defense as a wily 
lawyer's ploy, in which "soft," "bleeding 
heart" expert witnesses dupe gullible ju- 
rors into returning inappropriately ex- 
culpatory verdicts.52 As one result, the 
legal system winks broadly at testimony 
that talismanically finds "dangerous- 
ness" (based on behavior that, in reality, 
shows either a need for treatment or an 
ability to provide optimal care for one- 
self)53 or that denies nonresponsibility in 
criminal and civil cases where defend- 
ant's acts reflect textbook levels of men- 
tal disorder and pathology.54 
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In some instances, courts' reasoning 
appears phantasmic. In one recent case, 
turning on whether a defendant had the 
requisite specific intent to attempt a 
bank robbery, a federal district court 
refused to allow a county jail psychiatrist 
to testify that he had been prescribing 
antipsychotic medications for the de- 
fendant for a particular purpose and for 
a period of time, reasoning that such 
testimony "might be interfering with the 
treatment of [other] prisoners in jails 
because [other] prisoners might ask for 
more drugs to create the impression they 
need more Nowhere in any 
opinion in the case does it appear that 
there was ever any evidence introduced 
that spoke remotely to this issue; yet, the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed this decision as 
"not manifestly erroneous," offering no 
explanation for its finding.56 
"Morality" of Mental Health 
Professionals 
It is now necessary to consider the 
specific reading of "morality" engaged 
in by certain forensic mental health 
 professional^.^' We should begin by re- 
flecting upon Bernard Diamond'ss8 con- 
cern that, because of a witness's uncon- 
scious identification with one "side" of 
a legal battle or more conscious identi- 
fication with his own value system or 
ideological leanings, his "secret hope for 
victory for his own opinion [may lead 
to] innumerable subtle distortions and 
biases in his testimony that spring from 
this wish to triumph." 
Research by Homant and Kennedy59 
similarly seems to show that experts' 
opinions of insanity defense claims are 
positively correlated with the witness's 
underlying political ideology. Ben Bur- 
sten has argued further that any decision 
as to whether behavior is a product of 
mental illness is not a matter of scientific 
expertise, "but a matter of social pol- 
icy."60 We similarly cannot blind our- 
selves to the possibility that, in a whole 
variety of fact-settings, social bias fre- 
quently "infects and hides behind sci- 
entific j~dgments."~'  Other studies seem 
to confirm the influence of ideology on 
evaluators' assessments of civil psychic 
trauma cases.62 These positions and 
findings must be weighed against the 
backdrop of other research that demon- 
strates that an overwhelming percentage 
of all experienced forensic MHPs have 
significantly mistaken beliefs about the 
substantive insanity defense standard ac- 
tually employed in their j~risdict ion.~~ 
Thus, when involuntary civil commit- 
ment criteria were significantly tight- 
ened in the 1 9 7 0 ~ , ~ ~  it should not be 
surprising that some-but not 
MHPs responded fairly negatively to 
these developments, frequently seen as 
"turf  invasion^."^^ In a series of papers, 
Dr. Paul Chodoff, a prominent psychi- 
atrist, suggested that experts go along 
with legal standards "as long as they 
are. . .not tyranni~a1,"~'that they neither 
"acced[e] too readily to current trends" 
nor "succumb to prevailing fashion 
when they are convinced that it is not 
always in the best interests of [their] 
patients,"68 and that, in spite of legisla- 
tive or judicial standards mandating a 
dangerousness finding as the sine qua 
non of involuntary hospitalization, a 
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"wise and benevolent paternalism" will 
lead to the "moral judgment" that they 
are obligated to seek such hospitalization 
for a patient "incapable of voluntarily 
accepting help."69 And Dr. H. Richard 
Lamb70-organized psychiatry's most 
visible critic of deinstitutionalization- 
has assailed courts for interpreting civil 
commitment laws too "literally." 
Similarly, Dr. William McCormick7' 
has quoted an anonymous (but allegedly 
knowledgeable) medical colleague who 
reported, following the 1978 amend- 
ments to the Ontario Mental Health Act, 
"Doctors will continue to certify those 
whom they really believe should be cer- 
tified. They will merely learn a new lan- 
guage.'' Although there has been some 
empirical work responding to these phil- 
osophical positions and examples of an- 
ecdotal evidence,72 it can in no way di- 
minish the arguments' power. 
This notion that there is a "higher 
morality" to which forensic MHPs owe 
some sort of higher is, empiri- 
cally, an extraordinarily important one, 
and one that requires far greater atten- 
tion on the part of all those concerned 
about the underlying issues.74 Although 
some researchers and scholars have 
taken seriously the importance of this 
call in their reading of the effects of 
"legislative reform" on psychiatric hos- 
pital admissions rates,75 the whole ques- 
tion is strangely underdiscussed. Mi- 
chael S a k ~ ' ~ ~  recent reference to such 
witnesses as "imperial experts" who in- 
stall themselves as "temporary mon- 
arch[~]'' by replacing a "societal prefer- 
ence expressed through the law and legal 
process with [their] own preferences" 
should force us to more seriously con- 
front the dimensions of this issue. Al- 
though the sort of arrogation to which 
he refers is certainly not limited to foren- 
sic witnesses,77 and it is clear that such 
an attitude would not flourish if it were 
not tacitly endorsed by both jurors and 
l i t i g a t ~ r s , ~ ~  it is a problem that forensic 
MHPs (and lawyers working with such 
forensic experts) must carefully con- 
front. 
The Teleology of Courts 
Putting aside the important question 
of the dissonance of interests between 
courts and MHPs (the former ostensibly 
mostly focusing on community safety 
and the latter on psychological function- 
ing).79 I now want to consider the basic 
teleology of the courts.80 Notwithstand- 
ing the careful series of proposals crafted 
by Professors Monahan and Walker8' in 
their attempts to create a jurisprudence 
of social science, we must begin with the 
givens that, first, judges are suspicious 
of the psychological sciencesg2 and hos- 
tile to the use of social science in the 
legal processg3 and, second, their track 
record in this area has, generally, been 
"d readf~ l . "~~  
Perhaps courts see social science as a 
"threat,"85 perhaps it is feared that social 
science's "complexities. . .shake the 
judge's confidence in imposed solu- 
t i o n ~ , " ~ ~  and perhaps judges' lack of clar- 
ity about the underlying issues "permits 
[social science data] to be used as a kind 
of deus ex machina whose sudden ap- 
pearance produces the desired result."87 
Thus, although the Supreme Court re- 
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jected the carefully controlled "Baldus 
study" (examining over 2,000 death pen- 
alty cases involving 230 statistical vari- 
ables) in the McCleskey race discrimi- 
nation case, it was willing, in an obscure- 
to-the-lay-public jurisdiction case-that 
turned on whether a certain manufac- 
turer's product (a tire tube valve) was 
likely to have entered the "stream of 
commerce" in California-to accept un- 
critically a report, by an adverse party's 
lawyer, as to the results of his personal 
examination of the inventory of one mo- 
torcycle shop revealing that a substantial 
percentage of tire tubes included valves 
produced by the manufacturer in ques- 
t i ~ n . ' ~  
These attitudes lead to a debasement 
of social science research and data (even 
to the extent of suggesting that there is 
something faintly supernatural or fictive 
at its base), leading further to a triviali- 
zation of scientific discourse, and lead- 
ing finally to the teleological use of such 
data.89 Scholars have thus suggested that 
justices of the U.S. Supreme Court em- 
ploy an outcome-determinative ap- 
proach, "uncritically" accepting social 
science data bolstering opinions when 
they are in the majority, but "de- 
bunk[ingln it when they are in the mi- 
nority. "90 
The individual judging process in 
mental disability cases is also, of course, 
highly dependent on heuristic reasoning 
proces~es.~' The vivid and concrete case 
regularly "overwhelms the abstract 
data. . .upon which rational choices are 
often made."9' and studies consistently 
confirm that the "vividness" effect is 
actively present both in judicial 
 proceeding^^^ and, perhaps just as im- 
portantly, in our perceptions of judicial 
 proceeding^.^^ Thus, just as when sub- 
jects are presented with information 
about one welfare recipient will they 
generalize that data to all recipients, 
even when told that the particular ex- 
emplar was "highly atypical of the public 
at large,"95 so will the judge say-either 
aloud or sotto vocce-"The last time I 
let one of these guys go at the release 
hearing, he held up the 7-1 1 store down 
the street from my brother-in-law's, and 
I haven't stopped hearing about it since. 
Petition denied."96 
Of course, the courts are ovenvhelm- 
ingly ambivalent about expert testimony 
in the first place.97 On one hand, judges 
frantically desire experts to testify as to 
future dangerou~ness~~ (notwithstanding 
the experts' plea that they frequently do 
not have that expertise)" and to "take 
the weight" on difficult release-or-com- 
mit de~isions.'~)" On the other, they char- 
acterize psychiatry as "the ultimate wiz- 
ardry" and psychiatrists as "medicine 
m[e]n" or "shamanistic  wizard^."'^' 
More simply, as Alan Stonelo' has sug- 
gested, "the more they hate us, the more 
they need us." When the artificially de- 
manded "exact answer" is not avail- 
able,''' especially in an area where the 
ends of the law and the ends of mental 
health professionals do not coincide,lo4 
yet one additional layer of dissonance is 
added to the system. 
The Ambivalence of Juriesio5 
Jurors remain overwhelmingly ambi- 
valent about concepts of mental health, 
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mental disability as an animating expla- 
nation for behavior (especially when the 
behavior is socially deviant and/or crim- 
inal), and about the reception of expert 
mental health testimony.lo6 This behav- 
ior mirrors public attitudes: at the same 
time that we show the need to "invest 
[psychiatrists] with superior, almost su- 
pernatural powers,"'07 we remain con- 
temptuous of mental health principles 
because they appear contrary to our no- 
tions of 0CS.'08 Although courts rou- 
tinely talk about the expert's mystic in- 
fallibility" or "aura of near infallibil- 
ity,"lo9 it is likely that-because of the 
perception that such evidence is 
'~s~ft"' '~-jurors are "mildly interested" 
in but not "thunderstuck" by such tes- 
timony.' ' ' 
What we must remember here is that 
jurors, as the conscience of the com- 
munity, will continue to make heuristic 
judgments based on their ordinary com- 
mon sensical vision of "rough ju~t ice""~  
as to who "ought to be p~nished.""~ 
And when the substantive law fails to 
incorporate their "strong moral impul- 
s e ~ , " " ~  they may either enter what is 
called a nullification verdict'I5 (and ac- 
quit) or, what is far more likely, simply 
ignore the controlling legal principles 
(and convict). l 6  
A recent example of the latter is illus- 
trative. In Moore v. State,'I7 a "particu- 
larly gruesome" murder case in which 
an insanity defense was raised, a juror 
candidly answered voir dire questions by 
stating that he thought ( 1 )  the insanity 
defense was "overused," (2) that he 
couldn't "let somebody off' just because 
he was insane, and (3) his preexisting 
views on the insanity defense would 
"probably" prevent him from following 
the court's instructions.""* Notwith- 
standing this candid testimony, the trial 
judge refused to excuse the juror for 
cause. Although the ensuing conviction 
was reversed by the Florida Supreme 
Court,' l 9  there is little encouragement in 
the course of the opinion to suggest the 
unlikelihood of such a situation recur- 
ring. Cases such as this one remind us 
that the pretexts, morality and teleology 
of law, mental health professions, and 
the courts must, in the appropriate cases, 
be viewed through the filter of the jury's 
OCS as well. 
The Futility of Legislative Reform 
This conclusion leads us to consider 
the role of the legislature: is it realistic 
to look to legislative reform as a means 
of ameliorating these situations? To an- 
swer this question, we must look more 
narrowly at the issue of the development 
of involuntary civil commitment law. 
Although the 1970s were marked by 
a significant tightening of involuntary 
civil commitment standardsI2O (a trend 
that has been subsequently reversed as 
the "pendulum" has begun to swing in 
the direction of rebroadened criteria),I2' 
there is little evidence to suggest that 
mental health professionals rigorously 
adhered to the stricter legislative guide- 
l i ne~ . '~ '  Empirical evidence reveals, 
rather, that they more likely simply sub- 
stituted older, lack-of-insight based leg- 
islation in spite of the new laws to the 
contrary. '23 
Here, Drs. Bagby and ~ t k i n s o n l ~ ~  
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have speculated that such professionals 
exhibit "psychological reactance" in re- 
sisting legislative attempts to reduce 
their prer0gati~e.l~~ Because of this re- 
sistance-frequently grounded in a mis- 
guided sense of "moral obligation"'26- 
restrictive laws are ignored and some 
psychiatrists continue to commit those 
"whom they believe should be commit- 
ted."'27 Similarly, it has been suggested 
that broad statutory criteria "invite 
[medical witnesses] to implement hid- 
den agendas about treating the mentally 
ill and protecting s o ~ i e t y . " ' ~ ~  Phrased 
differently, this phenomenon reflects 
"cognitive dissonancem-the tendency 
of individuals to reinterpret information 
or experience that conflicts with their 
internally accepted or publicly stated be- 
liefs in order to avoid the unpleasant 
state that such inconsistencies pro- 
d ~ c e . ' ~ ~  Just as we can observe judicial 
cognitive dissonance at play in insanity 
defense cases (between judges' OCS and 
what we now understand about mental 
illness, its impact on criminal behavior, 
and the empirical disposition of insanity 
defense cases),I3O so we can observe 
professional cognitive dissonance here. 
In other words, in some instances 
where mental health reform legislation 
does not meet the paternalistic needs of 
MHPs, the statutes are simply sub- 
verted. 1 3 '  Bagby and his colleagues'32 
suggest that the "relative disregard of 
mental health law" has a long local his- 
tory, and that this problem raises "seri- 
ous questions about the feasibility of 
legislating the practice of mental health 
professionals." Although I am not so 
pessimistic, I suggest that these data are 
enormously important and deserve far 
wider dissemination among all policy 
makers in this area than it has received. 
The Rest of the World 
The outside world rarely shows any 
interest in or recognition of this whole 
bundle of issues until it is faced with the 
statistically rare case of the false nega- 
tive. Judge B a ~ e l o n ' ~ ~  has thus ques- 
tioned why "run-of-the-mill muggings 
by street toughs are too common for the 
front pages, but even the most banal 
burglary is newsworthy if committed by 
someone with a psychiatric history." 
Just as the vividness of media stories 
about particularly violent criminal of- 
fenses has a "disproportionate impact" 
on public perceptions about crime,134 SO 
does this publicity lead us to overattri- 
bute representativeness to the type of act 
in question or to the idiosyncratic per- 
sonality characteristics of the actor.135 
Thus, public agitation and concomi- 
tant legislative "correction" is driven by 
heuristic rea~0ning. I~~ A vivid, "outra- 
geous" case that shows the public "what 
happens" when someone "falls through 
the cracks" animates legislative reform 
to ensure that such errors not be repli- 
~ a t e d . ' ~ ~  In the state of Washington, 
after an individual who had been denied 
admission to a state hospital murdered 
two elderly neighbors (leading to a sig- 
nificant-and controversial-broaden- 
ing of civil commitment  standard^),'^^ 
commitments from the vicinage in ques- 
tion rose 100% even prior to the effective 
date of legislative reform.139 
Two other separate and seemingly un- 
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related points offer further illumination. 
There is now some significant evidence 
that street police officers-in many in- 
stances, the true "institutional gatekeep- 
ers"-employ their OCS-ical concept of 
mental illness (manifested as "disrepect, 
recalcitrance and moral defect") and 
shape their police reports through "dra- 
matic communications" so as to "mag- 
nify the subjective madness and danger- 
ousness of their subjects," and insure 
their admission into forensic psychiatric 
h0spita1s.l~~ Finally, at least one promi- 
nent forensic psychiatrist has recently 
written that, even though the recent 
amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Evidence barring "ultimate opinion" 
testimony'41 were "scientifically" unnec- 
essary, the new rule might still be justi- 
fied because of the American Psychiatric 
Association's "concern about the unfa- 
vorable public attitude towards psychi- 
atric participation in controversial in- 
sanity c a s e ~ . " ' ~ ~  
When added to the dominance of the 
heuristic legislative style, these two ad- 
ditional reports have additional impor- 
tance. First, they show that much of the 
data upon which we base our assump- 
tions, findings, and recommendations 
are governed by a cadre of individuals 
with absolutely no scientific or scholarly 
grounding upon which to base their ac- 
tions, but whose OCS is driven by a 
discrete and important "moral" system 
(perhaps not so much unlike the moral 
psychiatrists Dr. Chodoff spoke of).'43 
Second, they show the power of symbol- 
ism in forensic developments: notwith- 
standing behavioral or empirical merit, 
it is seen as essential-as a public rela- 
tions ploy-to the American Psychiatric 
Association that it endorse a rule of little 
scientific value so as to ward off political 
and social criticism. Perhaps it is this 
final piece of data that helps clarify the 
extent of the dilemma we face. 
Conclusion 
We cannot coherently explain any of 
the developments in question without 
considering the impact of heuristic rea- 
soning, the power of psychological re- 
actance and cognitive dissonance, and 
the dominance of OCS. We also need to 
pay further heed to reports that heuristic 
biases infect clinicians' reports as 
Also, we can never underestimate the 
role of what Professor Ernest Roberts'45 
has, in another context, characterized as 
"tensile strength": 
[Elvery legal principle can only hold a certain 
amount of emotional or political freight, and 
that amount is defined as tensile strength. 
When a principle is pushed beyond its tensile 
strength by expansionist litigators or creative 
legislators, it will simply fall apart. 
If the parallel law of hydraulic 
pressure146 raises arousal to "dysfunc- 
tionally high levels," there is the danger 
that innovation will be precluded be- 
cause the "limits of bounded rationality 
are e~ceeded." '~'  I think it is necessary 
for us to consider whether the lawlforen- 
sic mental health systems has yet 
reached this pressure point, and, if it 
has, whether it is in danger of becoming 
dysfunctional. 14' 
What, then, can we do? For a start, 
we need to start thinking about rebuild- 
ing some of our professional infrastruc- 
tures, a rebuilding that will require all to 
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redefine institutional and professional 
roles, to reconsider the way that we priv- 
ilege expertise, rethink the importance 
of moral preferences, recalibrate the way 
that the legal and behavioral communi- 
ties share responsibility and blame as 
well as "moral jurisdiction" over these 
matters, and to consciously confront the 
way that we employ "common sense" in 
this arena and the way that our cognitive 
simplifying devices distort the underly- 
ing social and political issues. If we can 
do this, and if we can acknowledge the 
way we act pretextually, decide cases 
telologically, think heuristically, and su- 
perimpose improper systems of moral- 
ity, we stand a chance of beginning to, 
finally, pursue agreement'49 between our 
two systems. 
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